![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
А вот что пишут про Alameda Research:
Alameda Research made its initial money in defeating AML controls at Japanese regional banks. They described it as an “arbitrage opportunity” because Bitcoin was more expensive at Japanese exchanges than at U.S. exchanges.
Mechanically, to profit from the arbitrage, you'd buy BTC with dollars, send to Japan, sell for BTC for yen, exchange your yen for dollars, and send those dollars back to the U.S. Then, you repeat this, at high velocity, for high amounts transacted, until the price converges in both locations.
The arbitrage existed because, in the wake of the Mt. Gox implosion, the Financial Services Agency (Japan’s banking regulator) told Japanese banks to be extremely skeptical of cryptocurrency businesses.
Alameda recruited a Japanese national to be the director of a Japanese company (both of these are considered less risky than the alternatives), then found a regional bank with weak compliance controls, and moved tens of millions of dollars daily through them with wires.
So the arbitrage profits that Alameda harvested for this trade was, effectively, payment for being the one actor in the ecosystem which combined a) willingness to transact in Bitcoin in both the U.S. and Japan and b) willingness and capability to suborn a Japanese bank.
То-то я удивлялся, откуда у них взялся такой чудесный арбитраж. А вот откуда - они просто обьезжали на кривой козе японские регуляции.
P.S. остальная статья тоже достойна внимания, но там более скучная теория, а в конце - живая практика.
Alameda Research made its initial money in defeating AML controls at Japanese regional banks. They described it as an “arbitrage opportunity” because Bitcoin was more expensive at Japanese exchanges than at U.S. exchanges.
Mechanically, to profit from the arbitrage, you'd buy BTC with dollars, send to Japan, sell for BTC for yen, exchange your yen for dollars, and send those dollars back to the U.S. Then, you repeat this, at high velocity, for high amounts transacted, until the price converges in both locations.
The arbitrage existed because, in the wake of the Mt. Gox implosion, the Financial Services Agency (Japan’s banking regulator) told Japanese banks to be extremely skeptical of cryptocurrency businesses.
Alameda recruited a Japanese national to be the director of a Japanese company (both of these are considered less risky than the alternatives), then found a regional bank with weak compliance controls, and moved tens of millions of dollars daily through them with wires.
So the arbitrage profits that Alameda harvested for this trade was, effectively, payment for being the one actor in the ecosystem which combined a) willingness to transact in Bitcoin in both the U.S. and Japan and b) willingness and capability to suborn a Japanese bank.
То-то я удивлялся, откуда у них взялся такой чудесный арбитраж. А вот откуда - они просто обьезжали на кривой козе японские регуляции.
P.S. остальная статья тоже достойна внимания, но там более скучная теория, а в конце - живая практика.
Tags: